What’s Changing

The End of Public Client Authentication
The CA/Browser Forum (CA/B Forum) is moving to prohibit the inclusion of the clientAuth Extended Key Usage (EKU) in certificates issued by public CAs. This change separates the WebPKI’s role (public server authentication) from the role of machine identity and access control (private client authentication). This affects all enterprises using public certificates for non-browser client authentication, such as VPN access, API gateways, or internal service mesh communication.
Direct Impact of clientAuth EKU Removal
| Scenario | Public Certificate Usage | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| API Authentication | Used to authenticate clients/machines to API gateways. | Service Disruption (Authentication fails) |
| VPN/Device Access | Used by devices or users for network access control. | Operational Outage (Access is denied) |
| Audit/Compliance | Policies currently allow public CAs for client identities. | Audit Failure (Non-compliance with policy) |
Migration Challenges and Critical Risks

How Digitorus Enables a Secure Migration
We provide a full-service strategy to manage this complex transition, ensuring a seamless move to a compliant, resilient machine identity foundation.
Phased Migration Journey
Our structured approach addresses all technical and compliance requirements before deployment.
- Phase 1
- Discover
- Inventory all affected certificates and map dependencies.
- Discover
- Phase 2
- Strategy
- Determine target architecture: Public, Private PKI, PKIaaS, or alternative method.
- Strategy
- Phase 3
- Implement
- Build or adopt the new CA environment and pilot enrollment and authentication.
- Implement
- Phase 4
- Migrate
- Orchestrate the systematic replacement of old public TLS clientAuth certificates.
- Migrate
Supporting Capabilities for Private PKI
Our expertise covers the full spectrum of private machine identity management and governance.

